Why we procreate

If your great-great-grandchild has your brown eyes and your blood type, but no other personality or physical traits uniquely identifiable to you, how much of "you" has really lived on?

Further, if the idea is to perpetuate our genetic lineage, what if we have children, but no grandchildren? Fundamentally, as humans, the problem with identifying the meaning of life with having children is this -- to link meaningfulness only with child production seems an affront to human dignity, individual differences, and personal choice.

Millions of homosexuals throughout the world do not have children biologically. Millions of heterosexual adults are unable to have children biologically.

For many adults, not having children is the right choice, for themselves, the world, the economy, or for their would-be children. Would we deny the meaningfulness of their impact or existence? From a moral perspective if you are giving of your life for an adopted child, a parent, creative production, teaching, volunteer work, or anything that helps others, adds to happiness, and makes the world a better place -- then an evolutionary genetic perspective seems irrelevant.

It is from such bedrocks that human meaning springs. Human meanings are worthwhile regardless of long-term, universal, final consequences, because they are meaningful now. Also, it's not just the seed alone that produces bountiful produce, it's the entire garden and all it takes to nurture it. The environment is a critical part of the equation. Evolution by natural selection occurs by differential survival and reproduction of genes in a population as a consequence of interactions with the environment.

There is also the danger of overpopulation, which could result in famine, disease, and environmental catastrophe, perhaps jeopardizing the future evolutionary success of the entire species. So, ironically, perhaps not having children is the best way to ensure longevity of the human genome. Unlike other animals, we can be conscious stewards of the future. So is making babies -- and having genes survive through the generations -- the meaning of life? The answer is yes -- from an evolutionary gene's eye view.

Making babies, and also other actions and social structures that result in the survival and reproduction of one's gene, such as protecting one's relatives. But pregnancy and giving birth were not without risks. This led to myths that idealised pregnancy and parenthood so that people would want to have more children.

The American psychologist Leta Hollingworth called these myths "social devices" that emphasised the positive aspects of reproduction and encouraged pregnancy. Biological processes occur at the time of delivery and after the birth of a child, but there is no evidence of biological processes that create the desire to have a child. If wanting children was instinctive, we would all have children and would continue to have them until we biologically no longer could.

Instead, our biological capacities allow us to make parenthood a choice. In the course of my research, I have found that the desire to procreate is rooted in strong pronatalist social and cultural pressures and influences, which have been with us for so long that people believe it is innate and a truth about life.

Over many generations, this belief has become an ingrained norm. There are several pronatalist attitudes and beliefs. Three important ones include what I call the pronatalist "Destiny Assumption", which is the idea that we are all destined to want children.

Most people do not want themselves or their loved ones to feel this way, which creates forms of direct or indirect pressure people put on one another to have children. The truth is, parenthood is but one way to find fulfilment in life. In general, women are judged more than men when it comes to not wanting children.

This stems from the pronatalist belief that motherhood is central to what it means to be a woman. However, many men have strong feelings about being childfree. In many of the interviews I conducted, the man often felt most strongly about this choice. In its local form anti-natalism applies only to particular people in certain instances.

In the case where a child would predictably experience a life so miserable as to be not worth living, it may be argued that procreation would be wrongful. Whether there are such lives—and if so, what characterizes them—is controversial, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that a life can be so irremediably miserable that it is of no benefit to the individual who endures it. Arguably, the lives of those born with Tay-Sachs disease fit this description, and many argue that it is immoral to knowingly bring such children into the world.

Some authors go much further than this, arguing that procreating is wrong unless the parent has reason to think he or she can provide the child with a good chance of a normal life. The general claim is that certain types of individuals have an interest in not being brought into existence on account of the quality of life they would have were they created McMahon ; Roberts ARTs allowing post-menopausal women to give birth have prompted objections to post-menopausal motherhood on grounds of child welfare; but such arguments seem to employ double standards see Cutas Cassidy holds that prospective parents who believe they will not be sufficiently competent should not procreate Cassidy Relatedly, Benatar argues that autonomy rights cannot permit risking severe harm to children; those who risk transmitting HIV, for instance, cannot assert a right to reproduce Benatar Local anti-natalism is also supported by the judgment that wrongful birth, birth which wrongfully imposes undue risk and harm on a resulting child, is possible Shiffrin Global anti-natalism opposes procreation in general.

One global anti-natalist position holds that in all cases procreation is a harm to those brought into being. Benatar argues that while existence brings pains as well as pleasures, non-existence is a lack of pains and pleasures. While pain is bad, absence of pain and pleasure is not bad, so it is always worse to be than not to be Benatar , ; see also discussion of Shiffrin , below; for responses, see Overall , Benatar and Wasserman Other global anti-natalist positions focus on harms or costs to others.

An environmentalist anti-natalism argues that procreation is wrong for the same reasons overconsumption is Young , MacIver An opportunity-cost anti-natalism argues that the money spent on rearing a child would be better spent on ameliorating the lives of those already existing Rachels And a misanthropic anti-natalism argues that humans cause so much harm — to other humans, non-human animals, and the environment — that there is a duty not to procreate Benatar Others have argued that the availability of children needing homes creates strong moral reasons to adopt rather than to procreate Friedrich , Rulli There are also intermediate positions.

For example, Sarah Conly argues that the interests that ground a right to procreate can be satisfied with only one child and so it may be permissible to restrict the number of children an individual creates when costs to third parties from overpopulation are substantial Conly , ; see also Statman Note that anti-natalists do not always defend legal restrictions, because interfering with procreation may involve intolerably illiberal coercion of the person.

Even those who do think that there are circumstances in which interference with procreation can be justified accept that there are important countervailing values.

One response to anti-natalist views is to provide a justification for the decision to procreate. Some authors, agreeing that procreation requires a justification and that many common reasons for procreating carry no moral weight, locate a possible justification in the unique nature of the parent-child relationship, the desire for pregnancy, or the desire to pass on valuable family traits Overall , Rulli , Brake , Ferracioli ; on whether one can make a rational decision to have a child, see Paul and Krishnamurthy For the most part, secular debates about the morality of procreation focus on whether and when procreation is impermissible, rather than whether it might be obligatory though see Smilansky and Gheaus on whether there could be a duty to procreate.

The debates concerning the impermissibility of procreation raise deep issues in metaphysics and value theory Belshaw ; Holtug ; Kavka ; Rachels We restrict our discussion to moral issues rather than legal ones, and assume throughout that reproduction is fully voluntary and informed—that is, neither coerced nor accidental.

It might be hoped that we could give a full account of permissible procreation by appealing only to the interests of the individuals affected by procreative decisions. Unfortunately, there is reason to think that this may not be possible. Consider the following sort of case, introduced into the literature by Parfit , and known as the non-identity problem Hanser ; Harman ; Woodward ; entry on the nonidentity problem :.

Intuitively, Marie does something wrong in deciding to have Amy rather than Sophie. Other versions of the non-identity problem involve different-number or non-comparative choices:. Sri has a genetic condition that she knows will cause any child she conceives to be born with a serious cognitive disability. Despite knowing this fact, Sri deliberately conceives and gives birth to a seriously cognitively disabled child, Aarav.

Assume, plausibly, that Amy and Aarav have lives that are worth living. Does Marie do something wrong in conceiving and giving birth to Amy? Does Sri do something wrong conceiving and giving birth to Aarav? Many are inclined to think that they do, but it is unclear how we can capture this wrongness by appeal only to the interests of the individuals involved.

This is because wronging someone seems to presuppose that things could have gone otherwise for that individual, but things could not have gone otherwise for either Amy or Aarav. It is therefore difficult to see how Marie might have harmed or wronged Amy. The non-identity problem is not solely a problem for the morality of procreation. Anyone who affects the welfare of future people in identity-affecting ways may face it.

Readers interested in general approaches to the non-identity problem should consult the relevant entry. Here we discuss just those aspects bearing on the ethics of becoming parents see also Hanser ; Vehmas Feinberg compares situations like the Marie and Sri cases with cases in which someone is harmed in the course of being saved from a greater harm e.

Shiffrin claims that we have serious qualms about harming someone without their consent to secure a pure benefit for them, even when we can be sure that they would regard the pure benefit as far outweighing the harm see also Steinbock and McClamrock She concludes that procreation is routinely more morally problematic than is generally recognized.

First, one might challenge the assumption that life is a pure benefit. Amy is not better off than she otherwise would have been, for there is no way that she otherwise would have been.

Furthermore, the argument may prove too much. If one is never justified in harming someone without their consent to impose a pure benefit on them, and if existence always involves some form of harm, then it must always be wrong to bring someone into existence. A global form of anti-natalism see Section 2. A number of authors, including Parfit, argue that we need to appeal to impersonal considerations to solve the non-identity problem.

Several of these solutions appeal to the role morality of parents. Freeman goes on to claim that the principle of parental responsibility entails that the very young and very old should not become parents. More recently, Wasserman has argued that whether it is permissible to bring a child into existence with certain characteristics such as impairments , depends on the reasons the prospective parents have for creating such a child.

These should be reasons that concern the good of the child, which can still support creating a child whose life will predictably go worse than that of another child who could be created instead Wasserman Others have taken similar reasoning to show that prospective parents can be morally criticized for their attitudes to future children, such that the desire to have a child with a harmful condition is wrongful Kahane Not all of those who have written on the non-identity problem accept that Marie does wrong in deciding to have Amy rather than Sophie, or that Sri does wrong in reproducing.

Indeed, some find the suggestion that it is wrong to knowingly bring disabled children into the world abhorrent due to the implications of such views for individuals with disabilities. Asch holds that a woman has a right to an abortion, but also that it would be wrong to have an abortion to prevent the birth of a disabled child.

The argument could easily be extended to decisions about whether to conceive a certain type of child. Does prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, communicate that disability is so terrible it warrants not being alive? On its face this claim is contestable; the associated decisions are highly specific to each case. And even if such acts did communicate something, it is unclear that it would be a thesis about relative qualities of life see also Buchanan et al.

For more discussion of the ethics of creating people with disabilities see encyclopedia article on disability: health, well-being, and personal relationships. Suppose that competent adults have the liberty to procreate. Are there limits on the means that they may take in order to do so? In this and the following section we focus on three methods of ART that have generated controversy: gamete donation, in vitro fertilization IVF , and commercial surrogacy.

Here we focus on technologies already widely used; for a discussion of reproductive human cloning, see the entry on cloning. Most discussion has centered on whether it is permissible for prospective parents to avail themselves of these novel technologies for procreation.

There has also been some debate over whether people have a claim to access these technologies through public health care systems or private health insurance. Most rich countries with universal health care provide some treatment for infertility.

Given limited resources, providing ART takes away from money that could be spent on other health care interventions Roberts In this context it is particularly important whether infertility is properly considered a disease or disability in need of treatment Neumann ; McLeod Another broad social concern raised by all these technologies is their role in the reproduction of race; when such technologies are used to produce racially similar children, they may perpetuate the idea of race as natural, as opposed to a social construction Russell Insemination by another man is not a new technology per se, but the modern phenomena of sperm banking and anonymous providers have led some to question the morality of artificial insemination by donor AID.

Some objections clearly have a religious basis; we therefore do not discuss them here. But some conservatives about procreative liberty have also developed secular objections to gamete donation.

The most interesting of these focuses on the practice of paying gamete providers. The process of harvesting ova also involves serious risks to the woman providing them, which are discussed in the description of the IVF process below. A different set of concerns centers on the moral responsibilities of gamete providers. Since in most jurisdictions gamete providers must waive all parental claims over their genetic offspring, it has been widely assumed that they do not have moral parental responsibilities.

Several philosophers have, however, argued that gamete donation is morally dubious, precisely because providers take their parental responsibilities too lightly Benatar ; Nelson ; Moschella The argument can be challenged in at least two ways.

First, we might challenge the claim that gamete providers typically treat their parental responsibilities too lightly by transferring or alienating them Bayne , Page , especially in the case when gamete donation occurs in a context in which assisted reproduction is regulated and would-be gamete recipients are screened.

Second, one could argue that in the broad nexus of persons responsible for creating a child through assisted reproduction, the contribution of gamete providers is not especially morally significant Fuscaldo See the entry on gamete donation and sale. However, recent critics have argued that gamete donors morally cannot transfer or alienate their parental responsibilities because these involve maintaining particular relationships which cannot be transferred Weinberg ; see also Brandt A distinct debate concerns the permissibility of procreating using anonymous gamete donors.

In response, Haslanger argues that not only does this view make certain forms of adoption morally suspect, it presupposes implausible connections between genetics, identity, and human flourishing Haslanger Anonymous donation is now illegal in a number of jurisdictions.

IVF involves fertilizing ova outside the womb and transferring resulting embryos into the uterus. The woman whose ova are used is given a hormone treatment that induces producing multiple ova, which are harvested by a needle inserted through the vaginal wall.

Fertilization may involve incubating the ovum in sperm or injecting a single sperm into the ovum in intracytoplasmic sperm injection ICSI. Several embryos are transferred into the uterus after three to five days. Objections to IVF have focused on negative consequences for the women or their offspring and on wider societal implications. Stimulation of the ovaries may lead to ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, a potentially serious condition.

Like any surgical procedure there are risks involved in retrieval of ova. Transferring multiple embryos increases risk of multiple pregnancy, which can be risky for both mother and fetuses. Fetuses born as a result of IVF may be at an increased risk of birth defects, lower birth weights, and premature birth Bower and Hansen ; Reefhuis et al. The absolute risk of these problems remains relatively low, however, and so they do not seem to justify a blanket prohibition on IVF.

Similar objections to those raised against gamete donation have also been raised against IVF, including that it commodifies children and female reproduction. Feminists have developed a more subtle critique. Sherwin argues that the powerful desires that many people, especially women, have for their own biological children are the product of problematic social arrangements and cultural values.

While reproductive technologies like IVF may help some privileged women get what they want, they also further entrench the oppressive societal values that create these powerful desires in the first place. IVF typically results in creating more embryos than are used in the fertility treatment. The remaining embryos may be given to other women for implantation, donated for research, destroyed, or cryogenically stored.

There are likely over a million cryogenically stored embryos in the United States alone Christianson et al. People who believe that such embryos have the same moral status as humans will judge that destroying them is wrong and creating them without a plan for implantation is comparably bad.

The use of surplus embryos as a source of totipotent stem cells for medical research has generated objections from religious groups and conservatives opposed to abortion. Consistency would seem to require that anyone who objects to using these embryos in research ought also to object to their creation in the first place, since it almost inevitably results in surplus embryos that will eventually be destroyed.

The gestational mother carries a child derived from the gametes of one or both members of the contracting couple and agrees to give the child over to the couple after birth. Surrogacy is now regulated in most countries. Commercial surrogacy is widely, although not universally, illegal, driving an increase in international surrogacy. Many of the disputes surrounding contract pregnancy focus on the question of who should be given parental rights and responsibilities if the arrangement breaks down.

In some cases, neither party to the arrangement wants to keep the baby; in other cases both parties want to keep it. Indeed, much of the impetus for recent accounts of the grounds of parenthood has derived from attempts to adjudicate such disputes Shanley , and see section 4.

For them, the right to procreate is a special case of the right to make binding contracts see Straehle, But it is not settled whether such contracts ought to be legal and, if so, enforceable.

One central point of contention is whether gestational surrogacy involves commodification—for example, by entailing that the gestational mother is selling her baby—or whether it is no different in kind from other forms of paid childcare Anderson ; Radin ; Glover et al.

It is also disputed whether a parental right acquired through gestation can be contractually transferred: on a gestationalist view which grounds the right to parent in the intimate relationship between gestator and fetus, the justification of the right entails that it is not subject to transfer Gheaus b, and see 4. A distinct concern has to do with whether anyone who undertakes a contractual obligation to surrender custody of future children can do so autonomously.

Some writers argue that such decisions cannot be autonomous, and hence that surrogacy contracts should not only be unenforceable but also illegal Dodds and Jones b; see Purdy and Oakley for a response. Casal and Williams suggest this:. To do so, however, need not exempt those parents from criticism at the bar of egalitarian justice. Footnote 8. However, whether we may criticize such procreators at the bar of justice depends on our view on the value of procreation.

Whether these considerations in favor of moral limits on procreation are decisive depends both on the costs imposed as well as on what is at stake for the prospective procreators. Without a view on the value of procreation, these are mere considerations in favor of criticism at the bar of justice. The claim that prospective procreators lack the right to procreate in the light of parental justice or environmental considerations implicitly assumes that procreation is not a special kind of activity which merits special protection: distributive considerations that apply to other plans in life — say, mountaineering or catamaran sailing — apply to procreation.

This is the no special status claim. This is a possible answer to the question raised by this paper. In the case of conflict between the morally relevant interests of procreators and those of others, we cannot appeal to the presumption because it cannot tell us whether any of the considerations against the moral permissibility of procreation actually render procreation impermissible. The presumption affirms the importance of procreation, without giving reasons for its importance, so we cannot determine what kind of reasons are strong enough to override it.

In order to decide whether procreation is morally permissible in the light of parental justice considerations, environmental considerations and the like, we need an account of the value in procreation. There are two reasons why we need to think about the value in procreation in a liberal theory.

First, people tend to think that procreation is special. Can liberal assign a special place to procreation as a matter of justice, or this simply a matter of the good? Footnote 9.

One could argue that the central question of this paper is based on a misconception, and that liberal neutrality precludes assigning a special place to procreation:. Hence, the value in these activities cannot be appealed to when engaged in liberal justification. This objection could be offered by those who defend the no special status claim. In response, one might either reject liberal neutrality and accept a form of liberal perfectionism, or try to show that some of the value in procreation can be appealed to by liberals without impermissible appeals to controversial conceptions of the good life.

I argue we should take the latter route, and tries to show that liberal theories can appeal to the value in procreation when engaged in liberal justification. Most liberal theories of justice, without taking a position on what a good life consists in, do rely on a thin theory of the good. Footnote 10 Some liberal theorists focus on the distribution of means and capacities to pursue plans in life. These theorists aim to identify certain all-purpose means for pursuing a broad range of plans on the basis of this thin theory of the good.

The distribution of these goods is a matter of justice, whereas the distribution of other things is not. For example, for Rawlsians, the distribution of income and wealth is a matter of justice, whereas the distribution of stamp-collections no matter how much one may value them is not. There is little agreement about the distribution of what exactly — opportunities, resources, welfare, primary goods, capabilities, etc.

However, in spite of this disagreement, there is much more consensus about which particular goods the distribuenda are relevant from the point of view of justice. Footnote 12 The arguments offered here aim to have a similarly broad appeal, especially to those theories of justice which focus on the distribution of opportunities to realize plans in life resources, capabilities, primary goods , but some arguments will appeal to those who defend outcome-focused metrics such as welfare as well.

Footnote 14 The protection of the capacity to make plans — whether one calls this capacity self-determination, autonomy, personhood — takes priority over other justice considerations.

A theory of justice also needs a view on the fair distribution of the relevant means. Activities granting access justice-relevant goods, play a different role in theories of distributive justice than those activities that do not. Take work for example, or positions of political power. Both give access to important goods, like income and wealth, power and self-respect.

Footnote 15 Hence, we treat access to these positions with special care. Access to positions of advantage is regulated by principles of justice, and if we can show that the position of procreator is such a position, we have reasons of justice to be concerned with access to and distribution of access to this position. This can be done without an impermissible appeal to comprehensive views about the importance of engaging in particular kinds of activities.

Consider an analogy with the arts. He distinguishes two strategies to defend cultural subsidies. Footnote 16 The Lofty approach appeals to the role that the arts play in leading the good life.

A perfectionist could claim that procreation and parenthood are essential elements of the good life. Footnote 17 Moderate perfectionists could argue that procreation and parenthood are excellent opportunities to attain some — virtues of excellence - that are part of the good life. These approaches are incompatible with non-perfectionist liberal views.

The economic justification takes a different route. Funding the arts may be permissible because it corrects market failures. Perhaps everybody will be less well off financially without subsidies. It may be too expensive for individuals to say pay an admission price that would cover costs, even though the museum would be beneficial economically, for example because it will attract visitors who will then spend money on coffee and souvenir shops as well, creating jobs.

Similar arguments apply to procreation. Subsidizing procreation may be justifiable if fertility levels are economically suboptimal: say, as an incentive to make sure procreation happens at a desirable rate. Footnote Although the economic justification is compatible with key liberal commitments, Dworkin argues that it fails to do justice to what makes culture valuable. The economic justification offers a poor account of the value in procreation, too.

Dworkin thinks there are other valuable goods that the arts provide, such as a shared cultural language, sources of value, standards of beauty, a connection with past generations, and so on.

This does not establish that the state ought to fund the arts, or by how much. Footnote 19 The present paper aims at doing just that for procreation, by showing that there is a strong pro-tanto case for supporting procreation.

I defend the view that procreation gives access both to goods 1 crucial for realizing any conception of the good and 2 necessary for the realization of a broad range of conceptions of the good. To be sure, one does not need to procreate oneself in order to gain access to the goods of procreation. Footnote 20 Whether one finds these particular arguments convincing, a commitment to liberal neutrality does not exclude an appeal to the value in certain activities for justifying rights.

It requires us to think about what the value and goods are at stake in certain practices. As long as they are valuable for reasons internal to a liberal view, liberals qua liberals can grant special status to certain activities.

Does the right to procreate belong on the list of basic rights and liberties, to which liberal theories of justice give priority? Fabre suggests this:.

In so far as the right to reproduce is a fundamental right, it follows that it cannot be curtailed for the sake of bringing about great material advantages for our successors. Freedom of conscience and free speech are clearly needed for the capacity to re- form plans, to learn about other views, etc.

Footnote 23 The connection between procreation and autonomy is not so straightforward. Not being able to procreate prevents one from pursuing only conceptions of the good which involve procreation. Similarly, not owning a Ferrari blocks all plans in life that involve Ferrari-ownership. But we are not entitled to everything we need to realize any conception of the good life.

Even if procreation is not itself protected by a basic right, perhaps it can be indirectly linked to other basic rights such as bodily integrity. Or one may point out that restricting procreative freedom is a threat to equal basic rights and liberties, because it affects women more than men. Both concerns rely on the claim that because enforcing limits on procreation is impermissible, people have a liberty- right to procreate.

This argument shows that the enforcement of limits on procreation is impermissible, not that procreation is morally permissible. Footnote 24 On this argument a liberty-right to procreate is at most a correlate of basic liberties.

Following Scheffler, imagine that, as in P. Footnote 25 Humanity will become extinct within a generation. Most would regret this, but is it a bad outcome from the point of view of a liberal theory of justice? Perhaps it is a loss from a cosmic point of view: humanity, and perhaps all intelligent life, would disappear. Some utilitarians would regret the end of human life, if it were to be sub-optimal in terms of overall utility.

Footnote 26 Would extinction be bad for existing people? This is a fascinating question, because it turns the question of intergenerational justice upside down: how do future generations affects existing people? I distinguish between two ways in which future generations, and procreation as the way to create them, have value on the collective level: the dependency argument and the meaning based argument.

Dependency arguments. Societies depend on the influx of new people for their functioning over time. Without the arrival of new people, the economy would not keep going. Who will fund pensions and healthcare? Who will staff factories, hospitals, or government? In addition, individual wellbeing also depends on the renewal of generations. Gheaus summarizes this nicely:. A new generation is needed in order to avoid that people die from necessarily painful and probably premature deaths.

Without new generations, the economy would collapse. It is unavoidable that many people end their lives in a state of dependency the old, the ill, the disabled and if there was no one to care for them they would die hungry, thirst, without pain relief and other palliative care. Basic needs will go unmet without newborns, and society will eventually collapse. Without procreation the institutions necessary for the protection of the basic liberties would not be sustained over time.

Hence, part of the value of procreation lies in the fact that without it, basic needs and basic rights would go unmet and just institutions could not be sustained. Hence, we could formulate two dependency arguments. Care-based argument: people have a fundamental interest in some people having on aggregate sufficient children to ensure adequate care and the protection of basic rights and liberties and their effective use.

Stable just institutions argument: people have a fundamental interest some people having on aggregate sufficient children to ensure that just institutions continue to function and exist. On the collective level, procreation is needed to protect basic needs, and basic needs must be met before people can make effective use of their basic liberties. Footnote 30 This connects procreation indirectly to the protection of basic needs.

Just institutions protect, among others things, basic rights and liberties, and hence procreation is directly linked to these as well. On a national level replacement migration might do some of the work needed to meet the care-based and sustainability of just institutions related worries, but for the world as a whole there is no alternative to procreation.

The loss of meaning argument. The value of future generations goes beyond this type of dependency. Take the Children of Men example again. Once we find out that we live in a childless world, would our plans of life be unaffected by the fact that humanity ends with us?

I can understand how the aristocrats and great landowners with no hope of posterity leave their estates untended. Many of our plans in life transcend the span of our own lives. We may be interested in human progress, in the future of our country, village, street or clubs. We may want to preserve historical buildings, keep traditions or languages alive, continue literary, philosophical or artistic traditions, protect things of beauty, and so on.