Relations between Britain and Germany were very good. This began to change, however. He felt that Russia to the east and France to the west were encircling Germany. As a result, he built up his armed forces. France and Russia feared Germany and did the same. During the s, all of the great powers in Europe began to build up their armies and navies.
British policy in Europe intended that no country in Europe should become completely dominant. If Russia, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary worried about each other, then they would be less of a threat to Britain. By about it was becoming clear to Britain that the greatest potential threat to Britain was going to be Germany. The strong economy, large population and powerful armed forces of Germany seemed to be capable of dominating Europe.
As a result, Britain began to support Russia and France. Britain joined the Triple Entente. Despite being part of the Triple Entente, Britain was not committed to going to war in The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, spent much of the summer of furiously trying to reassure Russia and Germany and prevent a war happening.
Germany hoped Britain would stay out of the war altogether. However, the Germans knew that Britain had promised to defend Belgium under the Treaty of London of The Germans wanted the British government to ignore the Treaty of London and let the German army pass through Belgium. The British government made much of their duty to protect Belgium. Belgium's ports were close to the British coast and German control of Belgium would have been seen as a serious threat to Britain. In the end, Britain refused to ignore the events of 4 August , when Germany attacked France through Belgium.
Within hours, Britain declared war on Germany. The Kaiser said how foolish he thought the British were. He said that Britain had gone to war for the sake of a "scrap of paper".
In , Germany and Austria-Hungary formed an alliance the Dual Alliance that gave them great strength in the centre of Europe. In , the French and the Russians formed their own strong alliance the Dual Entente that meant Germany now had an unfriendly power on each side.
Soon afterwards, Germany's most powerful soldier, General Schlieffen, drew up a plan that would allow Germany to beat France very quickly in any future war. This would then free most German troops to fight Russia in the east.
I am indebted to Dr K. Hamilton for this reference. The situation changed in the post period. Steinberg, in a chapter in F. Hinsley ed. For an introduction to this problem, see P. Schottelius and W.
Deist eds , Marine und Marinepolitik im Kaiserlichen Deutschland, — Schottelius and Deist, Marine und Marinepolitik , esp. Quoted in H. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone Oxford, p. The Times II Nov There was a sharp slump in the summer of which continued into and had a negative effect on both German and British industrial production. As a result, strong pressure was brought on Tirpitz to put out contracts for two battleships to private shipbuilders before the estimates for had been approved by the Reichstag.
I am indebted to Jonathan Steinberg for information on this point and also to the important material in Peter Christian Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von bis VI, no.
Quoted in Morris, Radicalism against War , p. Huldermann, Albert Ballin London, Compare the views in R. Aldcroft ed. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, — esp. Ever since, the arms race has loomed large in public narratives and memory of the lead-up to World War I. In the era of Cold War militarization and U.
In the past twenty-five years, however, the story of the Anglo-German race has lost its luster as a cautionary tale as Europe confines its 20 th century to history and confronts a present not haunted by the specter of big power arms competitions and war. Strikingly, there has been a sustained effort to rethink the Anglo-German arms race as a historical event, at least in the scholarly realm.
While scholars of German Weltpolitik and battleship construction continue to stress the seriousness of the German challenge to British naval mastery and the reality of the arms competition, many historians of the Royal Navy and the British Empire have come to downplay the centrality of the arms race and the larger Anglo-German antagonism for the understanding of British naval policy and strategy before Today, the place of the Anglo-German naval race in the historical imagination of the future remains an open question.
International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. DOI : Version 1. Naval Race between Germany and Great Britain, Selected Bibliography Berghahn, Volker R. Martin's Press. Hobson, Rolf: Imperialism at sea. Naval strategic thought, the ideology of sea power, and the Tirpitz Plan, , Boston Brill Academic Publishers. Kennedy, Paul M.
Lambert, Nicholas A. Massie, Robert K. Metadata Subjects. Author Keywords. GND Subject Headings. LC Subject Headings. Rameau Subject Headings. Regional Section s. Thematic Section s.
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