Why equality

The approach taken to defining the standard of comparison for both descriptive and prescriptive assertions of equality is very important Oppenheim In the descriptive case, the common standard is itself descriptive, for example when two people are said to have the same weight.

In the prescriptive use, the standard prescribes a norm or rule, for example when it is said people ought to be equal before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is a descriptive component, since the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which the rule or norm applies.

The question of this identification — who belongs to which category? On the other hand, the comparative standards contain something normative — a moral or legal rule, such as the U. Such a rule constitutes the prescriptive component Westen , chap. Sociological and economic analyses of in- equality mainly pose the questions of how inequalities can be determined and measured and what their causes and effects are. In contrast, social and political philosophy is in general concerned mainly with the following questions: what kind of equality, if any, should obtain, and with respect to whom and when?

Such is the case in this article as well. Rae ,p. Equality essentially consists of a tripartite relation between two or several objects or persons and one or several qualities. Two objects A and B are equal in a certain respect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general term. Every comparison presumes a tertium comparationis , a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equality applies — equality thus referring to a common sharing of this comparison-determining attribute.

There is another source of diversity as well: As Temkin , , argues, various different standards might be used to measure inequality, with the respect in which people are compared remaining constant. The difference between a general concept and different specific conceptions Rawls , p. Rae , p. Different principles yield different answers. Both equality and inequality are complex and multifaceted concepts Temkin , chap.

In any real historical context, it is clear that no single notion of equality can sweep the field Rae , p. Many egalitarians concede that much of our discussion of the concept is vague, but they believe there is also a common underlying strain of important moral concerns implicit in it Williams Above all, it serves to remind us of our common humanity, despite various differences cf.

In this sense, egalitarianism is often thought of as a single, coherent normative doctrine that embraces a variety of principles. Following the introduction of different principles and theories of equality, the discussion will return in the last section to the question how best to define egalitarianism and its core value.

Equality in its prescriptive usage is closely linked to morality and justice, and distributive justice in particular. Since antiquity equality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. On the history of the concept, cf. Albernethy , Benn , Brown , Dann , Thomson People and movements throughout history have used the language of justice to contest inequalities.

But what kind of role does equality play in a theory of justice? Philosophers have sought to clarify this by defending a variety of principles and conceptions of equality. This section introduces four such principles, ranging from the highly general and uncontroversial to the more specific and controversial. Different interpretations of the role of equality in a theory of justice emerge according to which of the four principles and metrics have been adopted. The first three principles of equality hold generally and primarily for all actions upon others and affecting others, and for their resulting circumstances.

From the fourth principle onward, i. When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard in this respect.

The crucial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons Berlin — But others claim that what is at stake here is a moral principle of justice, one reflecting the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments.

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , b—b; cf. Plato, Laws , VI. A way of treating others, or a distribution arising from it, is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, a way of treating others or a distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due.

Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, namely when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and comprehensive formulation of formal equality.

It indicates what produces an adequate equality. This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. For the formula to be usable, the potentially large variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally. This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories.

It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. Reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts.

Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental natural rights, deserts, and worth -— this is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality Hinsch Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these formal and proportional principles.

Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles, which themselves only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice. Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema.

It needs to be made precise — i. The formal postulate remains empty as long as it is unclear when, or through what features, two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice — over who is due what — can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal Aristotle, Politics , b For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told what kind of equality they are owed Nagel ; Rae ; Sen , p.

Every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific egalitarian conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, which are discussed below. Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature.

This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right, which assumed a natural order in which all human beings were equal. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time: everyone deserved the same dignity and respect.

This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which envisioned that all humans were equal before God, although this principle was not always adhered to in the later history of the church.

This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory.

Hobbes postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both self- ownership and freedom. Rousseau declared social inequality to be the result of a decline from the natural equality that characterized our harmonious state of nature, a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions Dahrendorf For Rousseau , , the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by binding individual subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty.

His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights Kant , p. Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights.

This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings Vlastos is widely accepted Carter , but see also Steinhoff In a period in which there is not agreement across the members of a complex society to any one metaphysical, religious, or traditional view Habermas , p. Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way Nagel In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin , p.

Recognizing that human beings are all equally individual does not mean treating them uniformly in any respects other than those in which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.

Disputes arise, of course, concerning what these claims amount to and how they should be resolved. Philosophical debates are concerned with the kind of equal treatment normatively required when we mutually consider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moral equality is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are to arrive at a clear moral standard.

Nevertheless, no conception of just equality can be deduced from the notion of moral equality. Rather, we find competing philosophical conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality. These need to be assessed according to their degree of fidelity to the deeper ideal of moral equality Kymlicka , p.

Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality. More materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria — the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is at stake here is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed, particularly once the approaches described above prove inadequate.

The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.

Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal shares. Westen , chap. This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution.

The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. For a justification of the presumption in favor of equality s.

Gosepath , II. The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice Gosepath One has only to analyze what can justify unequal treatment or unequal distribution in different spheres. To put it briefly, the following postulates of equality are at present generally considered morally required.

Strict equality is called for in the legal sphere of civil freedoms, since — putting aside limitation on freedom as punishment — there is no justification for any exceptions. As follows from the principle of formal equality, all citizens must have equal general rights and duties, which are grounded in general laws that apply to all. This is the postulate of legal equality. In addition, the postulate of equal freedom is equally valid: every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life, and this in the most far-reaching manner possible in a peaceful and appropriate social order.

In the political sphere, the possibilities for political participation should be equally distributed. All citizens have the same claim to participation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution, control, and exercise of political power. This is the postulate — requiring equal opportunity — of equal political power sharing.

To ensure equal opportunity, social institutions have to be designed in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged, e. In the social sphere, equally gifted and motivated citizens must have approximately the same chances to obtain offices and positions, independent of their economic or social class and native endowments. This is the postulate of fair equality of social opportunity. Any unequal outcome must nevertheless result from equality of opportunity, i. The equality required in the economic sphere is complex, taking account of several positions that — each according to the presumption of equality — justify a turn away from equality.

A salient problem here is what constitutes justified exceptions to equal distribution of goods, the main subfield in the debate over adequate conceptions of distributive equality and its currency. The following factors are usually considered eligible for justified unequal treatment: a need or differing natural disadvantages e. These factors play an essential, albeit varied, role in the following alternative egalitarian theories of distributive justice. These offer different accounts of what should be equalized in the economic sphere.

Most can be understood as applications of the presumption of equality whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not ; only a few like strict equality, libertarianism, and sufficiency are alternatives to the presumption. Every effort to interpret the concept of equality and to apply the principles of equality mentioned above demands a precise measure of the parameters of equality.

We need to know the dimensions within which the striving for equality is morally relevant. Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with the same material level of goods and services, represents a strict position as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generally rejected as untenable.

Hence, with the possible exception of Babeuf and Shaw , no prominent author or movement has demanded strict equality. Since egalitarianism has come to be widely associated with the demand for economic equality, and this in turn with communistic or socialistic ideas, it is important to stress that neither communism nor socialism — despite their protest against poverty and exploitation and their demand for social security for all citizens — calls for absolute economic equality.

The orthodox Marxist view of economic equality was expounded in the Critique of the Gotha Program Marx here rejects the idea of legal equality, on three grounds. First, he indicates, equality draws on a limited number of morally relevant perspectives and neglects others, thus having unequal effects. Second, theories of justice have concentrated excessively on distribution instead of the basic questions of production.

Third, a future communist society needs no law and no justice, since social conflicts will have vanished. As an idea, simple equality fails because of problems that are raised in regards to equality in general. It is useful to review these problems, as they require resolution in any plausible approach to equality. Through what concepts should equality and inequality be understood? It is thus clear that equality of material goods can lead to unequal satisfaction.

Money constitutes a typical, though inadequate, index; at the very least, equal opportunity has to be conceived in other terms. Should we seek to equalize the goods in question over complete individual lifetimes, or should we seek to ensure that various life segments are as equally provisioned as possible? Equality and efficiency need to be balanced. Often, Pareto-optimality is demanded in this respect, usually by economists.

A social condition is Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none Sen , chap. A widely discussed alternative to the Pareto principle is the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion. This stipulates that a rise in social welfare is always present when the benefits accruing through the distribution of value in a society exceed the corresponding costs.

A change thus becomes desirable when the winners in such a change could compensate the losers for their losses, and still retain a substantial profit. In contrast to the Pareto-criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion contains a compensation rule Kaldor For purposes of economic analysis, such theoretical models of optimal efficiency make a great deal of sense.

However, the analysis is always made relative to a starting situation that can itself be unjust and unequal. A society can thus be close to Pareto-optimality — i. For this reason, egalitarians claim that it may be necessary to reduce Pareto-optimality for the sake of justice, if there is no more egalitarian distribution that is also Pareto-optimal.

In the eyes of their critics, equality of whatever kind should not lead to some people having to make do with less, when this equalizing down does not benefit any of those who are in a worse position. In essence, since individuals desire different things, why should everyone receive the same goods?

Intuitively, for example, we can recognize that a sick person has other claims than a healthy person, and furnishing each with the same goods would be mistaken.

With simple equality, personal freedoms are unacceptably limited and distinctive individual qualities insufficiently acknowledged; in this way they are in fact unequally regarded. Furthermore, persons not only have a moral right to their own needs being considered, but a right and a duty to take responsibility for their own decisions and the resulting consequences. Working against the identification of distributive justice with simple equality, a basic postulate of many present-day egalitarians is as follows: human beings are themselves responsible for certain inequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside from minimum aid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for such inequalities but cf.

On the other hand, they are due compensation for inequalities that are not the result of self-chosen options. For egalitarians, the world is morally better when equality of life conditions prevail.

This is an amorphous ideal demanding further clarification. Why is such equality an ideal, and what precise currency of equality does it involve? By the same token, most egalitarians do not advocate an equality of outcome, but different kinds of equality of opportunity, due to their emphasis on a pair of morally central points: that individuals are responsible for their decisions, and that the only things to be considered objects of equality are those which serve the real interests of individuals.

The opportunities to be equalized between people can be opportunities for well-being i. It is not equality of objective or subjective well-being or resources themselves that should be equalized, but an equal opportunity to gain the well-being or resources one aspires to.

Such equality depends on their being a realm of options for each individual equal to the options enjoyed by all other persons, in the sense of the same prospects for fulfillment of preferences or the possession of resources. The opportunity must consist of possibilities one can really take advantage of. Equal opportunity prevails when human beings effectively enjoy equal realms of possibility. However, to strive only for equality of results is problematic.

To illustrate the point, let us briefly limit the discussion to a single action and the event or state of affairs resulting from it. Arguably, actions should not be judged solely by the moral quality of their results, as important as this may be. One must also consider the way in which the events or circumstances to be evaluated have come about. Generally speaking, a moral judgement requires not only the assessment of the results of the action in question the consequentialist aspect but, first and foremost, the assessment of the intention of the actor the deontological aspect.

The source and its moral quality influence the moral judgement of the results Pogge , sect. For example, if you strike me, your blow will hurt me; the pain I feel may be considered bad in itself, but the moral status of your blow will also depend on whether you were morally allowed such a gesture perhaps through parental status, although that is controversial or even obliged to execute it e. The most unequal countries, including the UK, have much worse social problems than the most equal countries.

If the UK were more equal, everyone would be better off. If inequality were halved, murder rates and obesity would halve too; mental illness would reduce by one-third; imprisonment rates and births to teenage mothers would decrease by one-fifth. Social mobility and levels of trust would greatly improve too. Income inequality arises first and foremost in the workplace and it is there that the remedies need to start - for example, by introducing low pay ratios, and promoting trade union and employment rights.

Reforming the tax system can produce greater equality - for example, by increasing inheritance and property tax, and cracking down on tax havens. Public services have a massive effect on increasing the well-being and opportunities of those on the lowest incomes - for example, by reducing the cost of university education for those who cannot afford it, and increasing the supply of good affordable housing. Subjects: Inequality Economic policy Social policy. Category: Reports. Put simply, the better-off could always invest more and more into the education of their children and will do so because they want their children to secure places at the elite colleges and in the top professions.

As the government spends more and more to narrow the gap, education budgets, and taxation must increase, but it is very difficult to sustain ever-increasing budgets and taxation consistent with winning democratic elections.

This threatens the political feasibility of such measures, though significant improvements may be made in the process. An alternative strategy, which treats the causes of social class as an obstacle to equality of opportunity, is available. Looking to education we may wish to ensure that all schools are equally well-resourced. As we saw above, one way of doing this is to devote increasing resources to poorer schools.

An alternative is to limit the resources that can be spent on private education, or to abolish elite private schooling all together, as it threatens equality of opportunity. However, such measures will likely be insufficient, even if feasible and effective.

This is because parent-child interactions as innocent as reading bedtime stories can enhance child development unequally. Interfering in the family is both politically difficult to justify and may be morally suspect as it compromises the values that the family embodies and promotes. A radical alternative is available, but it requires the eradication of social class and anything other than minimal wealth inequalities.

In such a society, no one would be so much better off than others that they have more free time, resources, better housing and health care so that their children develop to a greater extent or more quickly than others. This would be to address the causes of inequality of opportunity, but it would likely be highly unpopular with the electorate and some will argue that an economy where workers are paid roughly equally for different work, will be painfully inefficient.

Whether this is true cannot be proved here, but each of these strategies may be rejected on the grounds of being ineffective, infeasible or of compromising more important values, such as the value of the family or economic efficiency. Nevertheless, the first strategy appears to be the most promising and our commitment to equality of opportunity of some sort suggests that where we fall short of respecting freedom and equality in our society today, the educational institutions will be our first and most promising levers.

In addition, we need to think about the goal that we are trying to achieve within education, not only the goal that we care about for Equality of Opportunity in general, i. Disagreement about this concerns whether we should be concerned with equality of educational outcomes, equality of opportunities, or merely adequacy, and is partly motivated by the problems with meritocracy and responsibility noted above. Different standards of education might be appropriate for different types of equality of opportunity goals.

For instance, with respect to jobs, we might be very concerned that equally hard-working and naturally talented students achieve equal outcomes on standardized tests, since being the most qualified candidate usually gets you the job.

However, being a good citizen perhaps is independent of how well informed you are relative to others, so long as you are well-informed about various candidates and about how to spot a bad argument. Moreover, with respect to young children, we might think that outcomes, not opportunities are best in some areas, such as basic reading skills.

What we want, with respect to literacy, is not that children have equal opportunities to read, but that they actually learn to read, even if this comes at great cost. We should note that achieving equal outcomes will be differently costly for different individuals due to ranges of ability and the quickness with which children pick up certain skills. At the most extreme end of this spectrum are severe cognitive disabilities, which may render it very difficult or impossible to achieve equal outcomes.

As such, a desirable view of equality of opportunity may have to answer special sorts of questions around the appropriate education for those who have severe disabilities. Whatever the correct answers, we can only make progress on these questions by thinking seriously about the issues many of which are presented here in a way that is widely accessible. Our focus is on the application of conceptions of Equality of Opportunity to education, but there are many other goods that people value and should have equal opportunity to pursue.

For instance, most people value healthcare as it is important no matter what their ambitions and life plans are. Access to good doctors and basic medical treatment could be evaluated in terms of equality of opportunity. So, if some people face greater obstacles than others in getting to see a good doctor. If basic healthcare is expensive, then poorer people will face greater obstacles than the rich. If few doctors are willing to work in rural areas, then those in rural areas will face greater obstacles than those in urban areas.

These unequal obstacles may be condemnable, depending on the conception of Equality of Opportunity that is most desirable. Moreover, rather than focusing on particular goods, such as education and health, we may prefer to focus on happiness itself, since it seems to be the fundamental value that people care about.

Such a focus would enable us to condemn obstacles that stand in the way of health or education only insofar as those goods affect the happiness of those individuals. This makes an important difference if people wish to pursue health or education to different extents. We can say the same about health. The intention of this brief introduction to equality of opportunity and education was to introduce beginners to the ideal of equality of opportunity, its place within contemporary political debates and its history.

At this stage we might ask: why should anyone care about equality of opportunity? This takes us back to the start of the introduction. Arguing about equality of opportunity is really an argument about how best to understand the kind of society we should be striving for, one where free and equal persons live together. Although other ideals may also be worth striving for, equality of opportunity offers important guidance and a standpoint for criticism of contemporary societies, their politicians and our own personal conduct.

It enables us to judge some change as progress or backsliding. Educational institutions, in particular, are well situated to make those changes and failure to utilize them for this end can be judged to have been a further opportunity missed. What can be found on this website is a summary of different academic debates about equality of opportunity and education and an annotated bibliography of some of the key books and articles on the topic.

I start with a beginners reading list below, and go on to explain the crux of some key debates. The debates are divided into the following sections. The first section addresses the concept of equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. The second section considers different conceptions of equality of opportunity and debates about their relative merits. The third section covers debates about education and educational policy, including: school choice and the family, higher education, and whether adequacy or equality should be the principle for distributing educational resources and the aim of schooling.

The Spencer Foundation funded the creation of this site as part of a project that examines the relationship between the ideal of equality of opportunity and public education. View a complete list of the references on this site. Skip to content Skip to navigation. Equality of Opportunity and Education.

Search form Search. Intro and Sections. Applying the Ideas to Education The focus of this project is on the application of conceptions of Equality of Opportunity to education. Readings Arneson, Richard. Edited by Edward N Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, Brighouse, Harry , and Kenneth Howe. Educational Equality. Continuum, Gutmann, Amy. Democratic Education.

Princeton University Press, Jencks, Christopher. Ethics , Ethics, , Kittay, Eva Feder. Ethics , Ethics, , no. Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction.